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Theorizing Intergenerational Justice in
International Law: The Case of the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Hirokazu Miyazaki* & Annelise Riles**
On July 21, 2021, a resolution was introduced in the Chicago City
Council calling on the US government to ratify the new United Nations
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and describing
the struggle to abolish nuclear weapons as a matter of racial justice. Unlike
prior nuclear disarmament treaties, the TPNW bans all nuclear weapons
outright and reframes nuclear disarmament as a matter of decolonial
struggle. The coming into force of the TPNW treaty raises questions about
the relationship between this new treaty regime and the traditional
framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT).
In this Article, we argue for understanding the novelty of the TPNW
through the prism of intergenerational conflict and justice. The Nuclear Ban
Treaty comes into effect at a moment when the generation that personally
experienced nuclear warfare is quickly passing, and it speaks to a new
generation of activists and diplomats who place less hope in back-room
negotiations among great powers. More broadly, we argue for centering
intergenerational justice in international law. Although the question of what
each generation owes the next is not a standard frame of reference in
international law, as we suggest in Part II, upon closer analysis, questions
of intergenerational justice pervade may international legal problems, from
climate change to human rights to the law of war.
To address the challenge of intergenerational justice demands that
international lawyers develop more complex and subtle approaches to
intergenerational conflict and collaboration. In Part III, we borrow insights
from a global anti-nuclear art mural project with roots in Chicago's
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community-based struggles for racial justice in which political action is
framed as a problem of intergenerational collaboration.
Ultimately, we argue in Part IV that the contested relationship
between the NPT and the TPNW frameworks can be an opportunity for
intergenerational collaboration of its own. Progress on the elimination of
nuclear weapons now requires working across generational divides in
international law and developing methodologies and commitments to build
solidarity across generations of experts and activists.
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I. International Law and the Question of Generations .............................................128
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B. A Vague and Unstable Concept.................................................................. 133
C. Anti-Racism as Generational Thinking ..................................................... 136
II. Intergenerational Collaboration ................................................................................138
III. Towards Intergenerational Justice in International Law ....................................142
INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2021, a resolution was introduced in the Chicago City Council 1
calling on the U.S. government to ratify the new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which went into effect on January 22, 2021. Unlike
prior nuclear disarmament treaties,2 which primarily sought to limit the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states and to secure commitments from nuclear
states to reduce stockpiles and testing, the TPNW effectively erases the distinction
between nuclear and non-nuclear states and bans all nuclear weapons as a matter of
international law.3 The TPNW has been celebrated as the culmination of efforts to

1. The resolution is currently under consideration at the Council’s Committee on Health and
Human Relations Committee.
2. For example, consider the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
regime.
3. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted on July 7, 2017,
and went into effect on January 22, 2021. Unlike prior treaties, which sought only to limit the
“proliferation” of nuclear weapons, the TPNW bans all nuclear weapons as a matter of international
law. Article 1 lays out sweeping obligations on signatories:
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
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enhance the influence of small and non-nuclear states in frameworks long
controlled by states possessing nuclear weapons. 4 Moreover, although transnational
issue networks are increasingly recognized as international actors, the new treaty
envisions a much more robust and active partnership between nation-states and
civil society to abolish nuclear weapons. As Beatrice Fihn, the Executive Director
of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has stated: “A
treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons is not only a legal tool. A ban will also create
space for states, international organizations, civil society and individuals to carry out
the political work necessary to spread the commonsense understanding that
possessing nuclear weapons is unacceptable.”5
Around the world, the Nuclear Ban Treaty has energized grassroots activism
and local municipal government-level engagement.6 The Chicago resolution is part
of a nationwide “Back from the Brink” campaign, organized by a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) long dedicated to nuclear disarmament, 7 in
coordination with ICAN, the global coalition of anti-nuclear NGOs that led the
campaign for the ratification of the Nuclear Ban Treaty.8
The sponsor of the Chicago resolution is Maria Hadden, a first term Chicago
City alderwoman who is African-American. At an event introducing the resolution,
Alderwoman Hadden highlighted the fact that younger generations, including
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
4. Proponents argue that this distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states has been
critical to creating a prestige to nuclear weapons, and even a desire on the part of non-nuclear states to
join the “nuclear club.”
5. Beatrice Fihn, The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons, 59 SURVIVAL 43, 48 (2017).
6. Unlike prior nuclear treaties, the TPNW results from an International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), led by a coalition of NGOs and individuals dedicated to the elimination of
nuclear weapons, including the mayors and atomic bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See, e.g.,
Motoko Mekata, How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty: An Interview with Beatrice Fihn, 1 J.
FOR PEACE & NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 79 (2018); Tilman Ruff, Negotiating the UN Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of ICAN, 30 GLOB. CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 233 (2018);
Hirokazu Miyazaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki as Models of City Diplomacy, 16 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 1215
(2021). At the same time, the TPNW was ultimately championed by non-nuclear states and ultimately
draws its legitimacy by virtue of coming into force as a treaty on the traditional terms of the statefocused UN treaty regime.
7. These include such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Physicians for Social
Responsibility, and Soka Gakkai International.
8. The “Back from the Brink” campaign is decentralized, and each local resolution is
championed by local activists and organizations, including civic groups, religious organizations,
academics and universities, and inter-faith coalitions. As of August 2021, four states, three counties,
and fifty-four city councils have adopted resolutions to call on the U.S. Federal Government to ratify
and sign the TPNW. The “Back from the Brink” campaign has prepared and published several
resolution templates each of which includes “five policy solutions”—the pursuit of a “verifiable
agreement among nuclear armed states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals,” the foregoing of the first
use of nuclear weapons, the creation of oversight over the “president’s authority to order the use of
nuclear weapons,” the ending of the “hair-trigger alert” status of nuclear missiles, and the cancellation
of the 1.7 trillion dollar program to renew the entire nuclear arsenal. Municipal governments that have
endorsed the call have adopted the language of one of the templates, but many have also incorporated
their own perspectives into the language of their resolutions that reflect their community’s distinctive
historical relationship with nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear activism.
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herself, have not usually regarded the issue of nuclear weapons as urgent and
relevant to their world. However, Hadden explained that she convenes a Youth
Advisory Council composed of high school students in her district. Upon learning
that over 500 million dollars of Chicago taxpayers’ money is spent each year on
nuclear weapons, Youth Advisory Council members asked Haddon to make this
issue a priority for their ward. Hadden also noted that she sees a “disconnect” where
she and other city leaders seek to solve local issues of violence such as police reform
and gun control yet remain indifferent to the global violence of nuclear weapons.
Only a few months before fifty states ratified the treaty and it came into force
under international law, this treaty seemed like a fantasy, an impractical
dream. Many legal observers have dismissed resolutions like the one before the
Chicago city council, as merely “symbolic” activity. Like most such resolutions, the
Chicago resolution does not purport to exercise local municipal power over nuclear
activity within city limits. Its purpose, rather, is to call on federal authorities to
accede to the TPNW and work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Yet the events of 2020—from the rise of global digital social movements to
stated threats from then U.S. president Trump of launching a “limited” nuclear
attack (on the scale of Hiroshima or Nagasaki) on adversaries, to the collapse of the
non-proliferation regime with the withdrawal of the US and Russia from
longstanding treaties—ironically forged new coalitions and opened new horizons of
possibility. The treaty is also a product of a larger global political moment—of
which the Black Lives Matter movement is paradigmatic—in which obvious and
ever-present state violence can be called out, made newly apprehensible.
The coming into force of this treaty has raised new questions about the
relationship between this new regime and the traditional non-proliferation
negotiations within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the mainstream view, the two treaties proceed from
different paradigms—the NPT proceeds from a framework of national security, and
favors a realist approach, while the TPNW foregrounds instead international
humanitarian law and takes a more idealist approach. 9 The TPNW also provides a
greater opening for an anti-colonial and anti-racist perspective on nuclear
weapons.10 Finally, another innovation of the TPNW, relative to the NPT

9. From proponents’ point of view, one of the core innovations of the TPNW over the NPT
framework is its jettisoning of the national security model in favor of a theoretical approach that places
global “humanity” rather than nation states at the center of nuclear governance. The TPNW affirms
signatory states’ concerns about the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of nuclear weapons.
The humanitarian approach proceeds from an analogy between nuclear weapons and biological
weapons: “Because nuclear weapons by their very nature cannot make a distinction between civilians
and military targets, their use is generally recognized, except by the nuclear states and their allies, as
contrary to international humanitarian law . . .. The Humanitarian Initiative therefore proposes that
nuclear weapons should be prohibited—just as biological weapons were in 1972, chemical weapons in
1993, landmines in 1997, and cluster munitions in 2008.”
10. Another innovation of the TPNW is its explicit recognition of the disproportionate impact
of nuclear testing on indigenous peoples, and its tacit openness to arguments that nuclear weapons are
a product of colonial and radicalized power structures. The Preamble to the treaty states that signatory
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framework, is its vision of state sovereignty and of the relationship between
pluralistic actors in the international system.
Many of the traditional participants in NPT processes regard the Nuclear Ban
Treaty as redundant to their work since the ultimate objective of the NPT regime is
also nuclear disarmament. They view the new treaty as dividing the attention of
nation states and activists, and as presenting potentially conflicting international
legal norms and obligations. Others view the treaty as a shot in the arm for the
languishing NPT regime, which has suffered in recent years from a lack of
commitment and energy among expert communities in both the U.S. and Russia.11
For these commentators, the new treaty creates no new legal obligations since none
of the nuclear states or states under the nuclear umbrella are signatories, but it does
represent a cri de coeur from citizens around the world and from non-nuclear states,
demanding action from the experts in the NPT regime. For proponents of the
Nuclear Ban Treaty, in contrast, the treaty represents a fresh approach, and a
potential replacement of the old regime, after the disappointments of the NPT
process and the collective failure to achieve disarmament over more than fifty years.
In this Article, we argue that another perspective for understanding this treaty
is through the prism of intergenerational conflict and justice. The Nuclear Ban
Treaty comes into effect at a moment when a multitude of intergenerational issues
have become central to the debate about nuclear weapons. The generation that
personally experienced the effects of nuclear warfare—the hibakusha (survivors of
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), the architects of the NPT regime
states are: “Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear
weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons, “Recognizing the
disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples.” Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear
Weapons
pmbl.
(July
7,
2017),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
tectodevms/pages/2417/attachments/original/1571248124/TPNW-English1.pdf?1571248124.
Ritchie and Egeland have described the treaty as heralding a new “diplomacy of resistance” that
“constitutes a process of collective resistance to entrenched power structures that perpetuate the
existence of nuclear weapons.” Nick Ritchie & Kjølv Egeland, The Diplomacy of Resistance: Power, Hegemony
and Nuclear Disarmament, 30 GLOB. CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 121, 121 (2018).
11. The seeds of return to humanitarianism began not as a revolt against the NPT framework
but within that framework itself. In 2010, Switzerland, spurred by the International Red Cross,
proposed the addition of humanitarian language at the NPT Review conference. In 2014, 127 nations
signed a Humanitarian Pledge, framing nuclear non-proliferation as a matter of international
humanitarian law and calling on states to work “to stigmatize” nuclear weapons. The TPNW is the
culmination of this campaign among diplomats and activists to reframe the limitation of nuclear
weapons as a matter of global humanitarian law rather than national security.
Pivoting off the fractious NPT Review Conference in 2005 and the success of the
Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008, some had come to believe that recasting nuclear
disarmament diplomacy in humanitarian terms could be a way of changing a stale debate. It
seemed clear to them that what the disarmament process needed was not some ingenious
technical fix or diplomatic horse-trade, but a fundamental normative reset. As long as nuclear
weapons were seen as legitimate or even prestigious instruments of statecraft, they believed,
disarmament would remain a Sisyphean task . . . . In Gramscian terms, the hegemonic
ideology of nuclear weapons and nuclear discourses that selectively value and legitimise
nuclear weapons – nuclear “common sense” – needed to change in order to undermine
hierarchical political structures of nuclear power.
Ritchie & Egeland, supra note 10, at 127.
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such as George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, and Mikhail Gorbachev, and the ordinary
citizens who grew up with routine Cold War-era civil defense exercises—are aging
or have already passed. The intergenerational transfer of memory and anti-nuclear
commitment has therefore become an increasingly urgent issue in anti-nuclear
activism. Today, although young people are engaged in activism of many kinds
around issues of gender inequality, racial justice, and climate change, younger
generations of activists are less familiar with, or interested in, nuclear issues. The
preamble to the treaty directly addresses this challenge where it “[r]ecogniz[es] . . .
the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising
awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future
generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this
Treaty.” At the same time, the activists who have led the campaign for the
ratification of the Nuclear Ban Treaty are largely of a new generation.
The treaty also expressly frames a nuclear ban as a question of
intergenerational justice in its preamble: “Cognizant that the catastrophic
consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend
national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment,
socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of
current and future generations. . ..” In this context, the new treaty has offered a
space in which newer and older generations of activists are finding new points of
engagement—for both collaboration and conflict.
We take this treaty therefore as an opportunity to argue for centering
intergenerational justice in international law. We argue that one achievement of the
nuclear ban treaty is to foreground the many ways generations conflict and
collaborate in peace-building. Although the question of what each generation owes
the prior generation and the next is not a standard frame of reference in
international law, as we suggest in Part II, upon closer analysis, questions of
intergenerational justice pervade may international legal problems, from climate
change to human rights to the law of war. Reframing nuclear disarmament as a
question of racial justice for example powerfully engages new generations in the
cause. It is not enough simply to notice the question of intergenerational justice in
international law, however. We need more complex and subtle approaches to
intergenerational conflict and collaboration. In Part III, therefore, we borrow
insights from a global anti-nuclear art mural project with roots in Chicago’s
community-based responses to racial injustice that explicitly foregrounds
intergenerational collaboration. From this perspective, we argue in Part IV that the
contested relationship between the NPT and the TPNW frameworks can be
interpreted as an opportunity for intergenerational collaboration of its own. To
address this challenge demands that international lawyers engage more deeply with
questions of intergenerational justice in international law.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF GENERATIONS
A. International Legal Doctrine

Although the problem of relations among generations goes unremarked in
international law, upon closer analysis, numerous doctrines address it. For example,
the preamble to the UN Charter frames the work of international institutionbuilding as for the benefit of future generations: “We the peoples of the United
Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. . .”12
The Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (1993) likewise references “present
generations’ responsibilities towards future generations.”13 A UNESCO General
Conference of 1997 even adopted a Declaration on the Responsibilities of the
Present Generations Towards Future Generations.
In what follows, we trace how generations are invoked in three large areas of
international law with implications for nuclear non-proliferation—international
environmental law, international humanitarian law, and the memorialization of
atrocities in transitional justice. In these doctrines, the central question is the
question of obligation: what does each generation owe another? For example, the
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage imposes
on signatory states an obligation of “transmission to future generations of the
cultural and natural heritage.”14 In these duties to share resources, to remember, or
to transmit knowledge, the definition of generations and their relationship to one
another is abstract and vague. There is a common refrain of presumed antagonism:
each generation, it is assumed, displaces and disrupts the previous generation with
its different values and priorities, and has competing claims to resources.
One place in which intergenerational issues surface in international law is in
the protections afforded to children. The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC) establishes a diverse set of rights oriented toward the
situation of the child and gives moral and legal statuses to children. 15 This effort to
accord rights to children stems not only from their present unprotected status but
from their status as members of and links to future generations. 16 Some authors

12. U.N. Charter pmbl.
13. See Vienna Declaration on Human Rights Part I, ¶ 11, June 25, 1993 (“The right to
development should be fulfilled so as to meet equitably the developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations.”).
14. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 4
(Nov. 16, 1972), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4042287a4.html.
15. Maryanne Theobald, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: “Where Are We at in Recognising
Children’s Rights in Early Childhood, Three Decades on . . .?”, 51 INT’L J. EARLY CHILDHOOD 251, 251
(2019).
16. As Bohman puts it: “This problem of the lack of status extends beyond children alone and
includes many who lack rights and political statuses, including, most important, the rights of others who
are not yet citizens: future generations.” James Bohman, Children and the Rights of Citizens: Nondomination
and Intergenerational Justice, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 128, 129 (2011). Bohman argues that
“the rights owed to children express not only their statuses as human beings, communication partners,
and so on, but that children are also owed these rights because of their duties to the future of an
intergenerational community.” Id. at 137.
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frame the political disenfranchisement of children as a matter of intergenerational
injustice. For example, Steven Lecce advocates for a system that encourages
children to take more active interest in the values and processes of political decisionmaking and suggests that lowering the voting age would be a good way to do so. 17
Likewise, Geraldine Van Bueren, one of the original drafters of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, develops a concept of “multigenerational citizenship” and
argues that the inclusion of “the best interests of the child” implies state
responsibility to allow the participation of children in policy-making in “accordance
with their evolving capacities,” such as through child legislatures. 18
Another area in which intergenerational equity surfaces in international law is
in the regulation in international humanitarian law of relations between combatants,
who are generally young adults, and non-combatants, whose members include
greater representation of children on the one hand and older generations on the
other. Although international humanitarian law protects all persons who are not
taking part in the hostilities, the Geneva Conventions contain some additional
protections for the elderly.19
In recent years there has been much debate over the foundations of the
principle of child immunity as the specter of “child soldiers” and “child suicide
bombers” has proliferated in theories of war.20 Likewise, some scholars argue that
existing provisions “continue to reflect social constructions of vulnerability and
victimhood” and hence fail to protect adult civilian men from the horrors of war.21
17. Steven Lecce, Should Democracy Grow Up? Children and Voting Rights, 9 INTERGENERATIONAL
JUST. REV. 133 (2009).
18. See Geraldine Van Bueren, Multigenerational Citizenship: The Importance of Recognizing Children as
National and International Citizens, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 30, 35–37 (2011); see also
Seamus Byrne, Reclaiming Progressive Realisation: A Children’s Rights Analysis, 28 INT’L J. CHILD.’S RTS. 748,
750 (2020) (arguing that the principle of progressive realization in Art. 4 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child “requires that States expand their promotion and protection of
economic and social rights over time to the fullest extent possible within their available resources”).
19. E.g., “Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all
protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose
power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political
opinion”. Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 27,
¶ 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also id. at art. 17 (“The Parties to the conflict shall
endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded,
sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all
religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.”).
20. See, e.g., Emily Kalah Gade, Defining the Non-Combatant: How Do We Determine Who Is Worthy
of Protection in Violent Conflict? 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 219, 219 (2010) (“Western societal norms have
complicated our understanding and application of the principle of non-combatant immunity by
depicting combatancy in terms of innocence and guilt: those viewed as innocent deserve legal
protection. Child soldiers and female suicide bombers exemplify today’s complex and expanding
parameters of combat. Consequently, in practice, authorities in conflict zones cannot rely on existing
legal distinctions; instead, they are forced to make subjective judgements when deciding whom to
protect.”).
21. Michael Scott, Innocent Victims: Constructions of Vulnerability and Siege in International
Humanitarian
Law
1,
21,
22,
RESEARCHGATE
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281669958_Innocent_Victims_Constructions_of_Vulnera
bility_and_Siege_in_International_Law (demonstrating how constructions of vulnerability influence
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Perhaps nowhere is intergenerational justice more explicitly at the forefront of
international law, however, than in agreements relating to biodiversity and climate
change. “Problems of equity between generations arise from the depletion of
nonrenewable resources . . . and the elimination of renewable resources, from
degradation in the quality of environmental resources such as air, water and soils,
from loss of the environmental services performed by natural resources, from loss
of cultural resources, and from lack of effective access to natural and cultural
resources.”22 The precautionary principle enshrined in much international
environmental law is in its essence a generational concept—that “the present
generation has an obligation to proceed extremely cautiously in the face of scientific
uncertainty about risks of serious irreversible harm to future generations.” 23
As early as 1972, the Preamble to the Stockholm Declaration on the
Environment (1972) stated that it aimed to “defend and improve the environment
for present and future generations.” 24 The 1992 Convention on Climate Change
imposes a duty to protect the climate “for the benefit of present and future
generations,” while the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity speaks of
conserving biodiversity “for the benefit of present and future generations” 25 of
humankind, on the basis of equity.26 More recently, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) repeats this language of obligation to
“protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity.”27 In the area of nuclear safety, also, the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Water Management (1997) imposes a duty to avoid actions that
unreasonably burden future generations.28 A recent concurring opinion by Judge
Trindade in the International Court of Justice case Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
goes so far as to state that “Nowadays, in 2010, it can hardly be doubted that the

the treatment of different groups of civilians and arguing for the elimination of discrete categories of
protected non-combatants such as the elderly from the language of the Geneva Conventions in favor
of a simple distinction between civilian and military targets).
22. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 5 (1989).
23. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, ¶ 1, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter “Convention on Climate Change”]; Weiss, supra note 22, at 69. See also
VINCENT IALENTI, DEEP TIME RECKONING: HOW FUTURE THINKING CAN HELP EARTH NOW 4
(2020).
24. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, 3 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (Jul. 25, 1995).
25. Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
26. See Convention on Climate Change, supra note 23; see also Stockholm Declaration on the
Environment, June 16, 1972.
27. Id.
28. EMMANUEL AGIUS, INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 317 (Joerg Chet Tremmel ed., 2006).
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acknowledgment of intergenerational equity forms part of conventional wisdom in
International Environmental Law.”29
As the images of youth activists at the recent Glasgow COP26 meeting,
ridiculing the international lawyers as just so much “blah blah blah” suggests,30
climate change is a critical issue not only for abstract future generations but for
children’s rights and for relations between present-day adults and youth.31 Indeed,
in the area of climate, child activists and proponents of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child often position children and children’s rights as representatives
of as yet unborn generations. For example, Bohman concludes that if we accept that
nondomination is the goal of many of the provisions of the CRC, “we must include
the imposition of enormous costs on future generations as a temporal form of
domination and as the failure of the present generation to act as temporary
possessor of the power it shares with future generations.” 32
What exactly does intergenerational justice mean or demand in the context of
climate change? Despite the many references in the preambles of treaties, the
concepts of generation and generational equity remain quite abstract and
unspecified. Edith Brown Weiss, one of the sole voices to give structure to these
obligations, argues that “intergenerational equity” means that “each generation is
entitled to inherit a planet and cultural resource base at least as good as that of
previous generations.”33 For Weiss, nuclear waste disposal exemplifies the problem
of intergenerational equity. “Nuclear wastes pose four problems of justice between
generations: contamination of adjacent resources; contamination of global
commons, such as oceans; threats to public health; and land-use limitations on areas
near storage sites.”34 Although the language of generational justice in international
environmental treaties has little binding specificity, Weiss attempts to extract three
general principles of intergenerational equity from existing principles of
international law, such as the duty of non-discrimination,35 and duties to conserve
natural resources in individual treaties:36
First, each generation should be required to conserve the diversity of
the natural and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict
the options available to future generations . . .. Second, each generation
29. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 181, ¶ 122 (Apr.
20) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.); see also Lydia Slobodian, Defending the Future: Intergenerational Equity
in Climate Litigation, 32 Geo. Env’t L. Rev. 569, 572 (2020).
30. Denise Chow, ‘Blah, blah, blah’: Protestors Push for Action at COP26, NBC News (Nov. 2, 2021,
2:30
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/
blah-blah-blah-protesters-push-action-cop26-rcna4315.
31. Elizabeth D. Gibbons, Climate Change, Children’s Rights, and the Pursuit of Intergenerational Climate
Justice, 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 19, 20 (2014).
32. James Bohman, Children and the Rights of Citizens: Nondomination and Intergenerational Justice, 633
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 128, 139 (2010).
33. Edith B. Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 198, 198–207.
34. Id. at 171. See also VINCENT IALENTI, supra note 23.
35. Weiss, supra note 22, at 55.
36. Id. at 53.
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should be required to maintain the quality of the planet so that it is passed
on in no worse condition than the present generation received it . . .. Third,
each generation should provide its members with equitable rights of access
to the legacy from past generations and should conserve this access for
future generations.37
Weiss proposes addressing the interests of future generations through a trust38
concept borrowed from property law, in which estates are divided in time39: “At any
given time, each generation is both a custodian and a trustee of the planet for future
generations and a beneficiary of its fruits. This imposes obligations upon us to care
for the planet and gives us certain rights to use it.”40 Ultimately, Weiss calls for a
“Declaration Planetary Obligations and Rights” to codify this argument from
existing international law.41
In response, a number of commentators have argued for creating a guardian
ad litem regime to represent future generations’ environmental interests in treatymaking, international organizations, and national and international litigation. 42
Weiss proposes that such a guardian have standing in international and national
courts and administrative bodies which, she argues, are designed to address shortterm problems. “They are for the most part not well-suited to address long-range
problems, particularly those whose effects may not be felt for a generation or
more.”43 Another approach to empowering future generations is for representatives
of future generations—either intergenerational groups such as tribes, or classes of

37.
38.

Id. at 38.
EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Weiss, supra note 38, at 17. See also Bohman, supra note 32, at 137 (“The notion that the
present generation is a trustee holding past, present, and future sovereignty is an appropriate
development of the idea of an intergenerational polity. Thus, if democracies are to avoid
intergenerational domination, pooling sovereignty requires sharing statuses and freedoms across time.
The insecurity of intergenerational democratic domination can be avoided only if each generation has
both forward- and backward-looking rights and obligations to other generations (and not simply to past
and future individuals). Environmental security—a shared form of freedom across borders and
generations—is achieved only when no spatial or temporal demos can assert final authority over the
past, the present, and the future.”
41. Louis B. Sohn & Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity in International Law, 81 PROC.
ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 126 (1987).
42. Slobodian, supra note 29, at 576. The Maltese Government proposed establishing a guardian
for future generations in international fora on the theory that “future generations are similar to those
that our society has declared legally incompetent. The same consideration that presently supports
proxies for the incompetent among our contemporaries also gives credence to the idea of a proxy for
future generations where contemplated policies could impose substantial long-term risks.” Agius, supra
note 28, at 322.
43. Weiss, supra note 38, at 119. See also Maja Gopel & Malte Arhelger, How to Protect Future
Generations’ Rights in European Governance, 10 INTERGENERATIONAL JUST. REV. 4 (2010) (supporting the
creation of a Guardian).
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individuals who claim a shared interest with future generations, such as youth—to
bring lawsuits in domestic courts.44
Finally, if climate change and international humanitarian law raise the question
of what adults owe to children and to future generations, a third area of international
law—transitional justice—reverses the question to ask what obligations each
generation holds to memorialize the tragedies of the past, and what restitution is
owed by present generations for the atrocities of prior generations such as slavery,
forced labor, sexual violence, and genocide. Transitional justice approaches often
call for the continued memorializing of past violence through present day actions
by both state actors and non-state actors,45 such as erecting statues, including
discussions of past events in school textbooks, or holding official holidays and
memorial celebrations.46 In many cases, international law implicitly or explicitly
recognizes a duty on present generations to memorialize the violence experienced
by prior generations of victims and to take actions to atone for the actions of prior
generations of perpetrators.47
B. A Vague and Unstable Concept
In the areas of international law we have considered, the concept of generation
is ever present. But it remains undertheorized, abstract, vague, and unstable. First,
whether or not the interests of intergenerational justice, are treated as determinative
shifts from one period and one conflict to the next. For example, Sam Moyn argues
that in the early postwar period, the Holocaust was framed in a language of
“universal victimhood” and as “crimes against humanity” that were not specific to
any particular group or generation. In the 1960s, he argues, this abstract and
atemporal understanding gave way to Holocaust memory as a matter of
intergenerational obligations to remember.48 As Moyn writes:
Something drastic had happened: At some point a few decades ago,
it became publicly meaningful to dwell on wounds and “trauma.” A new

44. The Supreme Court of the Philippines recognized children and future generations as a class
with standing to challenge government action that threatened their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, finding that every generation has a responsibility to preserve the rhythm and harmony of
nature, and that the minors’ assertion of these rights fulfilled their own obligation to ensure protection
of the environment for future generations. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July
30, 1993) (Phil.).
45. Karen Knop & Annelise Riles, Space, Time, and Historical Injustice: A Feminist Conflict-of-Laws
Approach to the Comfort Women Agreement, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 853, 866 (2017).
46. E.g., as reparations for colonial era massacre of independence activists in Kenya, the British
government agreed to construct a memorial in Nairobi to the victims of the massacre. Id. at 864.
47. Shelton, supra note 59, at 135. See Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.13 (May 26, 2004); G.A. Res.
60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law (Dec. 16, 2005); Knop & Riles, supra note 45, at 864 (citing Christine Evans, The Right to
Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict (2012)) .
48. Samuel Moyn, Two Regimes of Memory, 103 AM. HIST. REV . 1182, 1186.
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type of memory had taken hold. Testimonies were recorded, monuments
erected, museums built, and curricula updated.49
Where generational interests are treated as dispositive, contradictory notions
of generation appear in the doctrine. In some cases, generations are identified with
reference to their experience of a specific event. The notion of “generation” first
appeared in popular discourse after World War I, to refer to returning soldiers who
shared a common experience of war, and an anger at the older generation that had
sent them to war.50 The anger of young climate activists at “older generations”
likewise adopts this understanding of generation as framed by a shared relationship
to epoch-making events. This understanding of generation draws on Karl
Mannheim’s sociological analysis of generations. For Mannheim, each new
generation experiences the world differently than previous generations, and each
generation shares similar core ideals and values throughout their lifetime. This
generational connection, or consciousness, influences individual attitudes and
views.51 As in both of these examples, “generation” often indexes generational
conflict: it is assumed that what defines a generation is its rejection of a prior
generation’s actions, values, or beliefs.
This concept of generation as singular historical experience has been critiqued
by feminists, sociologists of youth, and scholars of inequality, who argue that in the
rush to identify a shared generational ethos, it erases critical differences in
experience and identity.52 Writing about intergenerational conflict in feminist
theory, for example, media and cultural studies scholar Alison Winch argues that
“generation” is a slippery concept used to “scaffold inaccurate and often apolitically
charged historical narratives” that may homogenize experiences.53 Winch points out
how intergenerational conflict serves a neoliberal agenda by masking the underlying
49. Samuel Moyn, You Must Remember This, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 2016.
50. Astrid Erll, Generation in Literary History: Three Constellations of Generationality, Genealogy, and
Memory, 45 NEW LITERARY HIST. 385 (2014).
51. KARL MANNHEIM, THE PROBLEM OF GENERATIONS 26 (1952). E.g., Reger employs a
political generation approach, defined as “a group who share a similar political awakening brought about
by societal changes” as a way of understanding “patterns of continuity and change across generations
of feminist mobilization” JO REGER, EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE: CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM IN
THE UNITED STATES 285 (2012). Likewise, Thorpe and Inglis, speak of “generational consciousness”,
in which, following Mannheim, major events such as the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York
created a common experience among young people, giving a sense of being a part of a generation.
Christopher Thorpe & David Inglis, Do “Global Generations” Exist?: From Mannheim to Beck and Beyond, 1
YOUTH & GLOBALIZATION 40 (2019).
52. France and Roberts have situated the increasing use of “social generation” in youth
sociology and sociology more broadly as potentially representing a “new orthodoxy” in the discipline.
Alan France & Steven Roberts, The Problem of Social Generations: A Critique of the New Emerging Orthodoxy
in Youth Studies, 18 J. YOUTH STUD. 215 (2015). Providing a critical survey of the sociology of youth,
Roberts and France find that the concept of “generational units” does not adequately address inequality,
and that the use of “global generations” relies too heavily on research from the Global North and may
be inadequate for describing the experiences of youth in the Global South. Steven Roberts & Alan
France, Problematizing a Popular Panacea: A Critical Examination of the (Continued) Use of ‘Social Generations’
in Youth Sociology, 69 SOC. REV. 775 (2021).
53. Alison Winch, Does Feminism Have a Generation Gap? Blogging, Millennials and the Hip Hop
Generation 22 ANGELAKI 207 (2017).

2022]

Theorizing Intergenerational Justice in International Law

135

issues all face under neoliberalism. She argues that “generational mistrust” of baby
boomers “diverts attention from socio-economic problems that are driven by
neoliberal politics.”54 Winch nonetheless finds generations a productive,
intersectional tool when generational identities are located within the “conjuncture”
of larger, contradictory, social, and historical contexts.55
In other cases, the concept of generation references actual genealogical ties.
For example, studies of the children of Holocaust survivors have documented
experiences of second-generation trauma.56 Psychoanalytic approaches to
Holocaust memory have therefore sought to understand the “repetitive
temporality” of trauma in subsequent generations arising out of acts of mass
atrocity.57
In other cases, generation is not genealogical, but is rather a matter of the
difference between having direct experience of violence versus experiencing
violence mediated through circulating media and imagery. In this subsequent
generation, people experience historical violence not through personal experience
or even through kinship with actual victims or perpetrators, but rather through the
portrayal of violence in literature, film, journalism, and other media. So-called “postmemory” scholars such as Marianne Hirsch argue that what differentiates the
experience of the second generation of Holocaust survivors and beyond is that
memory is produced through media accessed in the public sphere more than
through stories handed down in the private sphere of the family. Postmemory is a
particular “structure of inter- and trans-generational transmission of traumatic
knowledge and experience. It is a consequence of traumatic recall but (unlike posttraumatic stress disorder) at a generational remove.”58
In other cases, generations are future-oriented, as in obligations to protect the
planet for future generations.59 In these references to obligations to future
generations, generations are often treated as an abstract and cross-cultural entity—
everywhere the same across class, gender and sexual orientation, culture and
ethnicity. Future generations become a stand-in for “mankind as a whole,”60 or “the
common heritage of mankind,”61 and generational rights are used interchangeably
54.
55.

Alison Winch, Feminism, Generation and Intersectionality, 2014 SOUNDINGS 9 (2014).
DOREEN MASSEY, IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMICS IN THE PRESENT MOMENT, in THE
NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 97, 97 (Sally Davison & Jonathan Rutherford eds., 2012).
56. Alice Bloch, How Memory Survives: Descendants of Auschwitz Survivors and the Progenic Tattoo, 168
THESIS ELEVEN 107 (2021).
57. Knop & Riles, supra note 45, at 901 (quoting DOMINICK LACAPRA, WRITING HISTORY,
WRITING TRAUMA 42 (2014)).
58. Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory, 29 POETICS TODAY 104, 106 (2012).
59. Dinah Shelton notes three possibly conflicting definitions of generation. What she terms a
“popular notion . . . that links individuals to historical, social or cultural events,” a notion of
“generations of lineal descendants” and a category of “future generations” meaning “those who will
not be born in the lifetime of anyone presently alive.” DINAH SHELTON, INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY, in SOLIDARITY: A STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123, 126–27 (Rüdige
Wolfrum & Chie Kojima eds., 2009).
60. Agius, supra note 28, at 321.
61. Weiss, supra note 38, at 30.
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with “planetary rights.”62 For feminist theorist Robyn Wiegman, this universality is
anchored in an assumed universality of parentage and heteronormativity. Writing
from a queer feminist perspective, she refuses any obligation to define oneself as
against or in conflict with a prior generation.63
C. Anti-Racism as Generational Thinking
The regulation and abolition of nuclear weapons is not one of the international
legal subjects that typically triggers generational analysis. Yet nuclear weapons
invoke elements of both the intergenerational justice of war memory, with its focus
on the transmission of commitment to remembering the violence of the past, and
the intergenerational justice of climate action, with its call to action on behalf of
somewhat abstract and unrealized future generations. Calls for nuclear disarmament
appeal both to a duty to remember the violence of the past and a duty to prevent
harms to a generalized future generation.
As we have seen, one of the inherent challenges is how to keep the
commitment of a prior generation not to repeat the horrors of violence alive in the
next generation. In anti-nuclear activism, the central challenge faced by hibakusha,
or nuclear bombing survivors, is how to transmit commitment from one generation
to the next as the numbers of persons with first-hand experience of nuclear war
dwindle with the passing of time. The Chicago resolution does something specific
in this context of the challenge of how to transmit political commitment across
generations. It is the first municipal resolution to explicitly link the production and
maintenance of nuclear weapons to issues of systemic racism. The resolution states
that the U.S. federal government’s use of taxpayers’ money for the maintenance and
renewal of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a racist policy which fails “to address safety
and security concerns of communities of color, both at home and abroad, while
prioritizing security concerns of white Americans.” Other resolutions have
referenced the disproportionate impact of weapons testing on indigenous
communities but have not made this larger claim of structural racism.
The indictment of U.S. nuclear policy as racist is not new; civil rights activists
have long drawn attention to the linkage between issues of military spending and
issues of economic inequality and poverty which disproportionately affect Black and
other minority populations. 64 In the immediate aftermath of the atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, contributors to African American

62. Weiss, supra note 38, at 96.
63. Robyn Wiegman, Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures, 31 NEW LITERARY HIST. 805 (2000).
64. The 1954 Bikini Atoll tests and the subsequent convening of the 1955 conference of African
and Asian countries framing anti-nuclear arguments around issues of European colonization and white
supremacy impacted African American civil rights leaders such as Richard Wright and Adam Clayton
Powell. VINCENT J. INTONDI, AFRICAN AMERICANS AGAINST THE BOMB: NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
COLONIALISM, AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT 46 (2015). Civil rights and anti-apartheid
leaders throughout the 1960s criticized U.S. support for South Africa to develop a nuclear weapons
infrastructure. See id. at 92. Martin Luther King’s mid-career rejection of nuclear weapons as “genocidal
and suicidal in character” represented a turning point in his characterization by many segments of the
American public as “anti-American.” Id., at 67.
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newspapers in Chicago queried the role race played in the decision to use atomic
bombs against Japan.65 Yet, the indictment of the U.S. nuclear policy as racist has
renewed potency at this moment in Chicago, in the context of energized youth
activism around Black Lives Matter. When Alderman Haddon frames these issues
in this way, she makes it possible to call upon new energies, relations, and
authorities—generation-old community alliances central to local legitimacy and
action. She purposely links one generation of activism to another.
Despite her critiques of the concept of generation in feminist theory, Winch
finds the fact of perceived or experienced generational differences within feminist
theory as “opportunities for dialogue” across those differences.66 In this respect, we
can see the Chicago resolution as a case study for how to build a greater global
movement by shifting from the wider context of generational conflict to
generational dialogue. Linking nuclear disarmament—something perceived as a
prior generation’s issue—to generational conflict in the context of the Black Lives
Matter movement reframes both sets of concerns.
Yet for all its innovation, the Chicago ordinance remains within a well-known
paradigm of municipal action, in which “progress” is metered by the demonstration
of municipal power, and linkages between organs and scales of the nation-state,
from local to global, are invoked. Although the Chicago ordinance is unique, it is
understood to participate in a global movement in which myriad similar ordinances,
literally created from templates produced by global activists, replicate one another
and in so doing create global norms. What matters here is the number of
municipalities that pass analogous resolutions, the number of countries that ratify.
Local differences or specificities ultimately are less significant than the effect of
mass support for ratification.
65. The Chicago resolution touches on the city’s historical role in the development of nuclear
weapons. CITY OF CHICAGO, CALL FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO CEASE SPENDING
FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EMBRACE UNITED NATIONS TREATY ON
PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MAKE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MAIN FOCUS
OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (2021). Chicago was once one of the key centers of the Manhattan
Project during World War II. It was at the University of Chicago where in 1942, a self-sustaining nuclear
chain reaction was achieved for the first time, and many of the scientists involved in those discoveries
were the first champions of efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. See Chicago, IL, ATOMIC HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, https://www.atomicheritage.org/location/chicago-il#:~:text=One%20of%20the%
20most%20important,could%20fuel%20a%20nuclear%20reaction (last visited Jan. 14, 2022). The
“Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,” founded by nuclear scientists at the University of Chicago, calls
nuclear weapons an “existential threat,” and publishes the famous “Doomsday Clock” every year. SCI.
& SEC. BD., 2021 DOOMSDAY CLOCK STATEMENT 2, 18 (2021). In 1986, the Chicago City Council
passed a Nuclear Free Zone Ordinance banning the “design, production, deployment, launching,
maintenance or storage of nuclear weapons or their component parts” within city boundaries. See
William N. Weaver et al., The Legality of the Chicago Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Ordinance, 17 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 553, 553, 555–56 (1986). That ordinance has never actually been enforced, although it remains on
the books to this day. Ordinances of this kind have been the subject of considerable litigation in the
United States, where federal authorities and private parties have claimed that they violate federal
authority to regulate trade or engage in foreign affairs. Since the nuclear-free zone activism of the 1980s,
the legitimacy of municipal governments’ engagement with the global policy debate about nuclear
weapons and other national security matters has been repeatedly questioned.
66. Winch, supra note 54, at 8.
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The issue then becomes how to effectively have this intergenerational
dialogue, and what forms this intergenerational dialogue might take. To think about
this methodological question, we now turn to a very different project also produced
in the shadow of the TPNW, a global anti-nuclear art project bringing together the
Chicago community mural tradition and the experiences of nuclear survivors in
Nagasaki that also draws energy and methods from the experiences of movements
for racial justice.
II. INTERGENERATIONAL COLLABORATION
The Kids Guernica project is a global art project in which children are invited
to collaboratively create large canvases depicting images of peace. Founded by a
group of art educators and practitioners in the U.S. and Japan in 1995 in
commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and the end of World War II and in recognition of Japan’s 1994
ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Children, 67 the project has
facilitated the creation of over 500 murals since 1995. We came to be involved in
the project in Nagasaki, alongside local peace activists and atomic bomb survivors
who had participated in it since 2003. In Nagasaki, the project has been incorporated
into the City of Nagasaki’s annual ceremony commemorating the atomic bombing
on August 9.
The Kids Guernica Project is anchored in two significant art traditions: first,
Pablo Picasso’s Guernica (1937), perhaps the most influential example of anti-war
artwork, and second, the U.S. community murals, so-called “People’s Art” such as
The Wall of Respect (1967), a community-based art movement initiated by African
American artists in Chicago in the context of civil rights activism. 68 The project
inherits from Guernica its theme—peace—its size (3.5 x 7.8 meters, or 11.5 x 25.5
feet)—, and most of all, its transportability. Just like Guernica did in its early years,
Kids Guernica murals are meant to circulate the world. Completed murals are
typically sent to another location for display alongside other murals created
elsewhere. Sometimes, canvases are carried by activists to another part of the world,
where they are completed by children in another community, who reflect on and
add to the work of others. The murals are designed to be displayed side-by-side with
other murals of the same size created by other children from elsewhere.
The Kids Guernica Project inherits from the community murals a
commitment to making art with and for a community, so that each mural is created
as a collective response to the community’s specific and changing political
concerns.69 As one of the founders of the project, Tom Anderson, a scholar of the

67. Kaoru Mizukuchi, Kizzu Gerunika Kokusai Kodomo Heiwahekiga Seisaku Purojekuto: Ibunkarikai
to bijutsukyoiku no kanosei [Kids Guernica International Peace Mural Creation Project: Cross-Cultural Understanding
and the Potential of Art Education], OTEMAE DAIGAKU RONSHU 189, 196 (2011).
68. Interview with Abe Toshifumi, in Osaka, Japan, (May 11, 2019) [hereinafter “Toshifumi
interview”].
69. Thomas Leroy Anderson, A Critical Analysis of American Street Murals: 1967-1982. (1983)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with University of Georgia); EVA COCKCROFT,
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history of U.S. community murals, has observed: “the entire project is
circumscribed by local specificity. Every mural is locally conceived and locally
constructed in relation to local conditions and concerns.”70 The project thus
elevates the specificity of each community’s experience both of violence and of
peace. In Kids Guernica workshops, participating children, in collaboration with
adults, are encouraged to express their conceptions of peace through images
particularly relevant to their situation, community, and history. Although painting
usually begins with short remarks about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
nuclear themes almost never appear in the paintings. Unlike community murals in
the U.S. that are regularly painted over after several years of completion, Kids
Guernica murals continue to circulate and be displayed side-by-side with older and
newer murals all over the world.
The project also borrows from the community mural tradition the challenge
and hope of collaboration. Community murals demand collaboration among artists
in the creation of the mural. They also prioritize collaboration between artists and
members of the community where the mural is located. Kids Guernica takes this
focus on collaboration a step further to prioritize and problematize collaboration
between adults and children. The core concern of Kids Guernica, according to art
education specialist and project co-founder Toshifumi Abe, is the intergenerational
transmission of cultural identity, commitment, and memory. In Abe’s view,
different kinds of intergenerational relationships manifest themselves in different
murals: “[Kids Guernica] workshops take many different forms. They do not have
a definitive form. This is because the relationship between [adults] and children
varies from one place to another.”71
Intergenerational collaboration is therefore a critical aspect of what the Kids
Guernica Project inherits from the Chicago mural tradition. In a typical Kids
Guernica peace mural collaborative creation event, adults do the preparatory work.
They negotiate with and select a school with whom to work together on a mural
creation project. They procure the canvas, paint, and other art supplies and give a
short commentary before children begin painting.
In our observation, organizers of Kids Guernica workshops in Nagasaki are
careful not to interfere with children’s creativity. They do offer some comments and
suggestions during the workshop. Sometimes they propose an overall framework or
theme for the mural and let children choose colors and images within that
framework. They try hard to respect children’s autonomy, and mostly they simply
prepare acrylic paint for children to use and focus on reminding children of space
left unpainted. However, toward the end of each workshop, after children complete
their activity, adults add finishing touches to the mural and hence do not leave the
painting only to children. In these subtle interventions, they are keenly aware of the

JOHN PITMAN WEBER & JAMES COCKCROFT, TOWARD A PEOPLE’S ART : THE CONTEMPORARY
MURAL MOVEMENT 3 (1977).
70. TOM ANDERSON, 2010 KIDS’ GUERNICA 3 (2009).
71. Toshifumi interview, supra note 68.
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need to strike a balance between the agency of adults and the agency of children.
Everyone involved in the global project agrees that the quality of the final product
depends on how well children and adults work together.
This is a stressful task, especially for adult organizers, and it is tempting for
them to make more forceful interventions and get the work done. These practical
temporal, ethical, and other challenges foreground and even amplify the urgency of
the challenge of intergenerational collaboration and its consequences. It is these
consequences that Kids Guernica murals record and make visible, and these
consequences, which are concrete results of specific intergenerational relationships,
in turn serve as simulations of the possible future consequences of a myriad of
ongoing broader efforts to pass on memories and commitments across generations.
The artwork therefore is a kind of practical negotiation between adults, with
their own frames of reference, time frames, agendas, and aesthetic ideals, and
children, with their own experiences of art-making and play, beginner’s mind,
aesthetic preferences, and interpretations of and reactions to adults’ framings and
interventions. As Anderson notes: “Every mural is a peacemaking process in its very
construction that proceeds, sometimes through stops and starts as each group learns
the lessons of cooperative activity and respect and tolerance for our fellow human
beings.”72 In his comparative analysis of workshops in Florida and Japan, Anderson
has observed a contrast between the individualistic orientation and “uneven” quality
of the U.S. mural and the collective orientation and the relative uniformity and
formal sophistication of the Japanese murals. Anderson concludes that this
difference indexes different dynamic processes of collaboration in the two
workshops.
These unique and differing practices of negotiation are apparent in the final
results, and organizers make no effort to hide the unevenness of the resulting
canvasses. Indeed, the founders of the project insist on preserving and appreciating
the unevenness in the quality of murals created by different groups. Each year, on
the anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a dozen
colorful murals created that year around the world are displayed along the banks of
a river flowing around the Atomic Bomb Hypocenter Park in Nagasaki, where
thousands jumped in the water to extinguish the flames, a place understood to be
heavy with the spirits of those who died there. The paintings add a colorful and
future-oriented vision to the otherwise somber site of mourning. Some murals look
highly polished and perhaps reflect adults’ overarching involvement. Other murals
are more rudimentary.
As with the figures of the original Guernica, the graphic traces of pain, anger,
and hope layered into these canvases are confusing and perhaps somewhat
unreadable to many viewers. However, the total effect of the accumulated
layering—collaboration upon collaboration, canvas next to canvas, each sharing in
the simplest of unity of form—identical size and purpose—yet differing entirely in

72.

ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 3.
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style, sophistication, and subject matter, creates a larger effect. When we observed
these displays, people paused silently, with curiosity and smiles, as they attempted
to decipher the paintings.
More broadly, the unevenness in quality and sophistication among the murals
serves as a testament to the challenges of intergenerational relationships that
manifest in each workshop. Polished final products may simply reflect the
asymmetrical power relation between adult organizers and child participants.
Similarly, rough and seemingly rudimentary murals may suggest a lack of active
conversation and collaboration between adults and children. What is displayed in a
Kids Guernica exhibition, therefore, is a demonstration of not only the diversity of
forms of intergenerational relationship but also of the consequences of these
relationships. The murals serve as the concrete results of specific intergenerational
collaborations juxtaposed to one other.
In Nagasaki, this display of murals of uneven quality entails particular
significance for the question of intergenerational relationality. Kids Guernica in
Nagasaki is an extension of the powerful local intergenerational concern with the
problem of how to pass on atomic bomb survivors’ memories of the atomic
bombing and their longstanding commitments to the elimination of nuclear
weapons to the next generations. This is a concern that has preoccupied many
involved in the organization of the annual commemoration for several decades, and
the urgency of the concern is amplified each year by the annual speech appealing
for peace and the elimination of nuclear weapons by the increasingly aging
representative of local atomic bomb survivors. Kids Guernica, and children’s
involvement in it, may be regarded as an example of the determination on the part
of the next generations to inherit atomic bomb survivors’ memory and commitment
and pass them on to the future.
Yet, in our observation, Kids Guernica adds a different vision to, and even
challenges, this intergenerational project, and its temporal orientation. It seems to
indicate that the burden of the obligation to pass on and inherit memory across
generations does not rest solely on aging atomic bomb survivors or on the younger
generations, but on the actual quality of intergenerational relationality.
In Kids Guernica, therefore, the problem of the intergenerational transmission
of commitment to a non-nuclear future, that is, the problem of post-memory, is
juxtaposed to other more immediate and practical issues of intergenerational
relationality. Kids Guernica refocuses the question of the relationship between
generation and genealogy on the practical challenge of collaboration between adults
and children or across generations. What is at stake is not so much the actual
transmission of memory or trauma as the negotiations associated with working
together on a large canvas and completing/finishing the work within a limited
amount of time (a workshop or two). In Kids Guernica workshops, the temporal
problem of the first generation passing and associated obligation for the second and
later generations to inherit the first generation’s memory and commitment is
replaced by the practical temporal constraint of the workshop in which adult

142

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol. 7:122

organizers and child participants need to complete a large piece of artwork within a
limited amount of time.
If the Chicago resolution seeks to bring issues, people, and organizations
together to achieve a single goal—the U.S. ratification of the TPNW—the Kids
Guernica project, which, it is worth noting, developed in tandem with the campaign
for the ratification of the TPNW, takes a different path. Rather than organize a
coalition of young and old towards a singular political goal such as ratification, it
embraces difference and multiplicity in goals, in a messy, nonsystematic, and
unpredictable fashion. If, as we saw, the TPNW offers a vision of a future goal—a
nuclear-free world—Kids Guernica murals present diverse and ever-changing loci
of futurity. The ultimate stated goal of Kids Guernica is not in fact even a nuclear
free world, but rather something more amorphous and greater, beyond the
elimination of nuclear weapons, that is, peace. Kids Guernica asks adults and
children first to make peace with one another, but in their own uneven terms.
III. TOWARDS INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The traditional building blocks of international law—nation-states—are
abstract and eternal. In recent years considerable progress has been made to bring
into view other kinds of international actors—from international institutions to
issue networks—but as these new actors enter the international legal plane their new
identity tends to shed one of the most common sociological features of institutions,
that is, how they reproduce themselves from one generation to the next. At the
other end of the spectrum, progress has also been made to bring history into view
in international law—to show how international law is influenced, as well as how it
manages and transforms history. Yet what remains absent in most historical debates
is an appreciation of intergenerational relations in international law: how and when
generational differences become salient, how the interests of generations may come
into conflict, and how the seeming perpetuity of nation-states masks processes of
constant recreation, as one generation transmits political commitments and
historical memory to the next, and as each generation considers what it owes prior
and future generations in its actions in the present. This is curious because in so
many of the most urgent areas of international law, such as the race to slow climate
change, youth are providing new leadership and framing their interventions in
directly generational terms.
The result is an odd formulation: on the one hand, the total disregard for
generation in mainstream international law in favor of a vision of eternal nationstates, while on the other hand, at international conferences, generational conflict
provides the energy and the story line but proceeds from a given and totalizing
assumption of generational contest and conflict. What is lacking from both
perspectives, from the perspective of Kids Guernica, is a commitment to
intergenerational justice: a commitment to a messy, indeterminate middle zone of
generational dialogue, struggle, and collaboration.
Despite the absence of generational analysis in international legal debates
surrounding nuclear weapons, the effects of nuclear testing and nuclear warfare are
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matters of generational justice. The environmental impact of nuclear testing spans
many generations, and many victims fear that the health effects of exposure to
radiation from both testing and nuclear bombings are transmitted from one
generation to the next. Activists are aware that the generation that experienced the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the generation that grew up under the
cold war threat of nuclear war, when ordinary citizens were routinely exposed to
apocalyptic images of nuclear warfare and were regularly enlisted in civil defense
exercises, is now passing. A younger generation has grown up without a
consciousness of an immediate threat of nuclear war, and except for communities
with direct experience of the bombings or nuclear testing such as Nagasaki, New
Caledonia, or Bikini Atoll, the elimination of nuclear weapons is less of a political
focus among younger generations in many parts of the world than issues of climate
change, inequality, or racial justice. The Kids Guernica art project we have described
picks up on and amplifies the issues of intergenerational justice swirling in and
around activist communities.
Factually speaking, the law and policy regulating nuclear weapons is also
deeply generational. The new Nuclear Ban Treaty is the work of a self-described
new generation of activists and experts who understand themselves to bring new
perspectives, values, and concerns than the aging community of activists and experts
working in and around the more established non-proliferation regime. As we have
seen, the Nuclear Ban Treaty explicitly frames the issue of nuclear weapons as a
matter of generational relationships.
It has been said by critics of the TPNW that unlike the NPT, which envisions
a gradual reduction in nuclear weapons over time, the TPNW naively calls for the
immediate elimination of all nuclear weapons. Yet the nation-states and activists
that led the campaign for the ratification of the TPNW are aware that without the
support of nuclear states, nuclear weapons will remain permissible de facto if not
de jure under international law. Yet the orientation of the Nuclear Ban Treaty is
therefore not toward the immediate present at all, but rather toward the future.
After the demonstrated limitations of the technocratic NPT process, moreover,
hope for immediate results from that process have faded. One purpose of the treaty,
then, is to reignite the passions of a new generation of activists around nuclear
disarmament, and to lay the groundwork for a future free of nuclear weapons. We
have seen how, in the local context of Chicago municipal politics, an
intergenerational perspective broke through deadlocks and stale debates and made
possible a new coalition of young and old activists and new perspectives on the
importance of bringing an end to nuclear weapons.
The central legal question in nuclear disarmament now concerns the
relationship between the two treaty regimes—the older NPT framework and the
newer Nuclear Ban Treaty. As we have seen, the new treaty offers a different
theoretical framework—humanitarian law rather than national security—a vision of
nuclear disarmament as a matter for all nation states and not solely the nuclear
powers, and a more pluralistic vision of the collaborative roles of nation states and
transnational issue networks. The Nuclear Ban treaty itself asserts that the two
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regimes are complementary, although the communities of experts who participate
in both frameworks have not always embraced this view.
A perspective from intergenerational justice provides unique purchase on the
relationship between the treaties. First, we can observe that, factually speaking, the
two treaty regimes are two communities of experts who understand themselves as
separated by a generational divide.
From this perspective, the question of the relationship between the treaties
becomes an opportunity for an exercise in intergenerational justice, a potential zone
of intergenerational peacemaking. That is, the legal question of the relationship
between the two treaties becomes a sociological and political question of how two
generations of experts might work together towards a shared goal of disarmament.
Here, Kids Guernica offers an unexpected model: The experience of Kids
Guernica is that intergenerational justice emerges from the engaged practice of
difference, from the limits of linkages between issues and communities, from lack
of understanding, as much as from harmonization and negotiated agreement. As we
saw, much of the language of “future generations” that graces the preambles of
international treaties is so vague and generalized that it is not operational as
international legal commitments or as perspectives for engagement across
generations. The approach of Kids Guernica is precisely the opposite: putting aside
grand and vague questions of the nature of peace, or disarmament, or of the
relationships between children and adults, the artists (both children and adults) set
themselves a concrete and time bound task: to complete a specific mural of a
specific size, within the given constraints of time. As we saw, the results of these
exercises in concrete intergenerational justice were a range of uneven and different
canvases—reflecting different circumstances and differing approaches to
intergenerational collaboration.
In much the same way, while the two treaties and associated communities of
experts have many theoretical differences, both regimes set the stage for a number
of concrete projects where potential collaboration could substantially further the
cause of nuclear disarmament. For example, Article 6 of the nuclear ban treaty
concerns “victim assistance and environmental remediation” for the “use or testing
of nuclear weapons.” It commits state parties “with respect to individuals under its
jurisdiction” to “provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, without
discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as
well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.”73 This quite expansive
definition of the rights of victims and the obligations of states to provide
compensation and reparations would represent a substantial step towards justice
and much-needed assistance to disproportionately impacted communities.
Although it seems unlikely that nuclear states and nuclear umbrella states will ratify
the treaty soon, one could imagine that many of these states—or rather the
communities of experts within those states working within the NPT regime—might
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find the political will to work with local communities and with organizations
involved in the Nuclear Ban Treaty to leverage and expand existing compensation
schemes to benefit victims. The same might be true of obligations under the Nuclear
Ban treaty to engage in environmental remediation in areas of nuclear testing, or of
the obligations of states that have tested nuclear weapons to provide technical and
financial assistance to small states which have been sites of nuclear testing so that
environmental remediation can occur.74
Such projects might put aside questions of harmonization in international law
to engage in more concrete, achievable and arguably significant state actions. What
is important here is that each of these projects not only necessitate collaboration
among different generations of experts; each is also a project of intergenerational
justice. Given that so much time has passed since the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki or the testing at Bikini Atoll and elsewhere, assistance for victims of testing
and nuclear bombings, or environmental remediation is now by definition a matter
of intergenerational reparations. Unlike the vague notions of “future generations”
that now increasingly appear in international documents, however, what is at stake
in the question of how to bring together these two treaties are a series of concrete
generational identities and problems: how specific nuclear experts can reach across
the generational divide to collaborate; what kind of compensation and reparations
to present generations might best recognize and respond to the devastation to
communities a generation ago and their ongoing impacts on present generations of
those communities.
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